The disbandment of the Marine Branch of the South African Navy (SAN) in 1990 following the end of the Border War, culminated in the loss of a marine capability geared to operate in an amphibious theatre. Budget cuts and the need to acquire new warships necessitated the disbandment of the marines. Following the country's reacceptance into the international community in 1994, the newly formed South African National Defence Force (SANDF) found itself within a very short space of time involved in peace missions in the troubled Great Lakes region and elsewhere. The SAN, as part of the SANDF, was also drawn into peace missions. Members of the Protection Force and the Operational Diving Teams (ODTs) participated in peace missions and other exercises that demanded the marine capability. With the realisation that South Africa has been, and still is, involved in peace missions, the Chief of the SAN (C Navy) decided to resurrect such capability through the creation of the Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS) in 2006. The MRS, however, does not mirror the defunct marines because it incorporates other elements such as divers who were absent in the first two marines. Even though it faces challenges, the MRS has conducted, and continues to conduct, various exercises and operations in support of South Africa's foreign policy efforts.
Introduction
Marine forces, hereafter "marines", are some of the specialised armed forces in the world. Marines imbue navies with a marine capability, which may be defined as the ability of amphibious forces to conduct operations such as amphibious engagement, crisis response, amphibious raids, amphibious assaults, amphibious withdrawals and amphibious demonstrations at sea. 1 Navies world-wide have established marines in order to gain dominance in the amphibious theatre of engagement during both peace and war. Throughout the years, marines were used in various operations. For instance, the United States Marine Corps (USMC), which is perhaps the world's largest marine force, participated in various amphibious operations such as Operation Desert Storm in 1991 in Iraq and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in 1998 to name but a few. 2 In the 21 st century, marines are mainly used for constabulary functions such as anti-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. 3 The recent scourge of piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa has resulted in several countries sending their marines as efforts to eradicate the problem.
The SAN has established and disbanded two types of marines between 1951 and 1990. More recently, new marines were established in the form of the MRS, which signify the resurrection of the marine capability in the SAN. The roles and functions of the MRS include the following:
• conducting inland water patrols, on lakes, waterways and rivers;
• conducting search and seizure operations during inland water patrols;
• executing boarding operations in national and international waters;
• providing deployable small craft, both inshore in the littoral and on inland waters in a defensive role;
• protecting SAN and visiting vessels in national and international harbours and anchorages;
• conducting ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore operations;
• ferrying limited personnel in the inshore littoral and the inland waters; and
• providing operational small craft support services to other state departments.
This article emanates from the research conducted for a thesis, "South African naval diplomacy since 1994", in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Science at Stellenbosch University.
The aim of this article is to analyse the MRS as the resurrected marine capability of the SAN. The article commences by offering an overview of South African marine capability. It then contextualises the need for the marines in the post-1994 settlement, followed by a description of various elements of the MRS, namely the Operational Boat Division (OBD), the Operational Diving Division (ODD), the Reaction Force Division (RFD) and the Maintenance Division. The article also focuses on various exercises and operational deployments conducted by the MRS since its formation with the view of highlighting successes and challenges.
An Overview of South African Marine Capability
Although a marine capability in the SAN dates back to 1951, it lacks continuous or unbroken history. South Africa has established three various types of marines since the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1912. The first marines came to existence on 1 July 1951 in the form of the South African Corps of Marines, 5 with Brigadier P. de Waal appointed Naval and Marine Chief of Staff. 6 It consisted of eight permanent force coast regiments, a marine technical centre, one training unit, seven citizen force coast regiments, Walvis Bay Heavy Battery, two light anti-aircraft regiments, four anti-aircraft batteries, three radar companies and the marine branch of the Naval and Marine Gymnasium. 7 Unfortunately, the South African Corps of Marines existed for only five years. The main reason for its disbandment included the sophistication of Russian battleships equipped with guided missile launchers during the Cold War (from the 1940s to 1990). These ships rendered counter-bombardment forces obsolete; and this reality coupled with the fact that the South African Corps of Marines was perceived as a gratuitous expense led to the decision to discard coastal artillery. 8 Subsequently, the South African Corps of Marines was disbanded on 1 October 1955. 9 During the Cold War when African states became the battleground for proxy wars between two opposing blocks led by the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the SAN lacked a marine capability. 10 As the Cold War intensified, South Africa, particularly the South African Defence Force, fought the Border War between 1966 and 1989 in Namibia (then South West Africa) and Angola. 11 Suddenly, the need to resuscitate a marine capability to patrol the coast, rivers and lakes as part of the counter-insurgency strategy became apparent. 12 Subsequently, the second marines designated as 1 Marine Brigade was created in 1979. 13 Their main purpose was to enable the SAN to participate in counter-insurgency operations, 14 as well as the protection of naval bases and facilities. 15 Initially, a brigade size force (hence 1 Marine
Brigade) capable of sea-borne operations was envisaged. However, budget cuts and great emphasis on landward counter-insurgency strategy, prevented the marines from reaching the intended size. Instead, the marines never exceeded two battalions, hence the Marine Battalion rather than the Marine Brigade.
The Marine Battalion was later designated as the Marine Branch. 18 However, the end of the Border War coupled with the political developments in South Africa rendered the marines redundant.
Budgetary cuts made decision-makers disband the marines in 1990 19 and the SAN retrenched 2 258 members of its personnel. 20 The decision, which then seemed rational, was revisited in the post-1994 settlement following the country's transition to democracy.
The Need for Marines in the Post-1994 South Africa
Following the disbandment of the marines, South Africa was left with no forces geared for marine-type operations. The country's reacceptance into the international community following the 1994 democratic elections coincided with several ferocious intra-state conflicts ravaging several parts of Africa. 21 Subsequently, all major policy documents of the country reflected the need to contribute to eradicating African conflicts. In order to play a positive role in conflicts, South Africa entered into a peace mission discourse, which later featured in various policy documents. International peace missions are regarded as secondary functions of the SANDF as contained in major South African policy documents such as the White Paper on Defence and the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. 22 Since 1997, the country has been instrumental in brokering African peace.
It brokered peace in Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Additionally, South African peacekeepers deployed to countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Comoros, Eritrea-Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Sudan. 23 Evidently, South Africa began taking centre stage in conflict resolution and management in the region beginning with mediation efforts in several countries. In 1997, the then South African President, Nelson Mandela, mediated between Mobutu Sese Seko, then President of Zaire, and Laurent Kabila. 24 Initially, Mandela sought to convince Mobutu to form a coalition government with Kabila.
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Later in May 1997, South Africa initiated Operation White Dove during the Great Lakes peace process. 26 The operation was part of South African naval diplomacy and involved the use of the now decommissioned SAS Outeniqua, docked at Pointe Noire in the DRC, as a feasible non-aligned platform for peace negotiations. 27 The South African government utilised SAS Outeniqua as the venue for peace talks at sea, off the coast of Zaire, away from the hostilities. 28 The talks resulted in what became known as the Outeniqua Agreement or Accord, named after the ship, which sought Laurent Kabila succeeding Mobutu Sese Seko as the President of Zaire, and eventually changing the country's name to the DRC. 29 Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President of South Africa, congratulated the SAN for "discharging its responsibilities with great distinction and loyalty to the national cause" 30 during the 1997 negotiations in the DRC. He also stressed that the SAN is a significant partner in the realisation of the African Renaissance. The Outeniqua Agreement proved difficult to implement leading to the SANDF being involved in the peace process.
Given the dynamics of the Great Lakes and the fact that the SANDF did not have marine-style trained forces, the SAN was soon called to assist. 31 Unfortunately, its contribution was limited by the lack of the disbanded marine capability. In fact, some scholars such as Heitman argued that " [t] he Navy should further consider establishing a small marine branch to handle the very specialised and highly demanding role of amphibious raids and larger-scale beach-landing operations" 32 needed for the African continent. It seems the recommendations failed to resonate, at the time, with the leadership and the reasons for that, whether budgetary or otherwise, are unclear. Nonetheless, it was apparent that Africa was in a state of flux and that the SANDF would commence playing a major role in conflict resolution and management.
When the Burundi conflict emerged after rebels attacked Bujumbura, Mandela became the leader of the Arusha Peace Process in December 1999. South Africa commenced deploying a contingent to protect negotiators during the process. Following the institutionalisation of the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB), the SANDF deployed 1 264 personnel of whom 44 were members from the SAN. The maritime contingent was responsible for waterborne operations in Lake Tanganyika covering about 133 km. The SAN used harbour patrol boats (HPBs), operated by members of the Protection Force, to conduct operations. 33 The employment of these elements illustrated the need for naval forces geared for operating in fresh water as well as amphibious theatres. However, that capability diminished with the disbandment of the Marine Branch. In an interview with Navy News in 2005, Vice-Admiral J. Mudimu, C Navy, stated he was "considering the possibility of reconstituting the '(m)arines'" 34 to be able to deal with African challenges in the 21 st century. Hence, the MRS came to existence as an effort to resurrect the marine capability a year after C Navy's statement.
Resurrection of Marines: The Maritime Reaction Squadron
The The CoO, however, is out of date because the MRS is currently conducting operations, which were not initially envisioned such as antipiracy operations. Subsequently, the MRS is in a process of revising and updating the CoO, but its approval date is yet to be determined. 42 The contents of the new CoO remain classified, but it seems it will be more suited for the current operational environment. 43 One can postulate that anti-piracy operations will feature prominently in the new CoO. The most pertinent argument that transpired during some interviews with anonymous participants includes the fact that the current CoO lacks provision for Force Protection and Reaction Teams to deploy with each and every sea-going ship at any given time. This renders the ships vulnerable, especially in the current environment where piracy at sea is rife. Currently, only divers deploy with sea-going ships at all times. Another argument was that members of the MRS should be highly trained in order to withdraw special forces elements operating with them. Special forces are strategic assets, which should only be employed in severe circumstances such as anti-piracy. Regardless of the revealed issues, it is clear that the MRS is more than a marine force because it consists of four interconnected components, namely OBD, ODD, RFD and the Maintenance Division.
44
Operational Boat Division Following its incorporation into the MRS, the ODD conducts domestic diving, search and rescue, deep diving at 54 meters, mine hunting and mine clearance, underwater device disposal, underwater salvaging, underwater drilling and welding, as well as other tasks. 56 The equipment of the ODD includes a compression chamber for divers, six-and four-meter boats, as well as normal diving equipment. One of the major challenges facing the OOD is the four-meter boats, which have surpassed their 16-year life span in 2008. The only serviceable boats currently available are the sixmeter boats, which are difficult to transport using the four-wheel drives of the MRS. Despite these challenges, the ODD has completed several operations under the banner of the MRS. Some of the operations include deployment with the South African Air Force (SAAF), humanitarian relief in Mozambique, and assisting Tanzanian authorities as part of South African naval cooperation with the region as discussed later. In September 2011, ferry Spice Islander, capsized off Zanzibar and resulted in one of the catastrophic maritime disasters in history. The ferry capsized en route between Unguja and Pemba, which are two islands off the coast of Tanzania. It is suspected that more than 1 000 voyagers were on board. 60 Divers from the ODD managed to recover more than 200 bodies. 61 It is some of these activities that make the ODD an important component of the MRS.
Reaction Force Division
The RFD is a brainchild of Vice-Admiral Mudimu and is crucial in projecting South Africa's foreign policy objectives with regard to bringing peace to the African continent as well as African waters. 62 Although it is still in its infancy, the RFD should be understood as the main component of the marines that resurrected the capability lost when the Marine Branch was disbanded in 1990. Members of the RFD require both mental and physical strength as well as tenacity and fortitude to complete the rigorous selection process successfully. 63 The RFD is an important component in anti-piracy operations, given the fact that South Africa recently illustrated its political will to eradicate the scourge of piracy, or at least prevent it from reaching Southern African waters. The RFD began as a Reaction Force in 2005 when former members of the Marine Branch trained 109 members from the Military Skills Development System intake. Their training commenced at the SAS Saldanha military area. Both RFD and OBD members receive similar training and are deployed to the various divisions in terms of need.
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These members also receive motorised infantry training, which make them versatile. They are able to serve in both infantry and amphibious roles.
The Reaction Force, before the inception of the MRS in 2006, was commonly known as the MRS. This is, however, unsurprising given the fact that it is the core of the new unit. Prior to the establishment of the Reaction Force, the various divisions (now part of the MRS) existed as separate entities. They were only amalgamated to augment the capabilities of the Reaction Force by forming part of the MRS in 2006. The Reaction Force participated in various operations and has assisted other state departments. In June 2007, the Reaction Force together with the Operational Boat Squadron and SAS Tobie executed Operation Intexo assisting the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Operation Intexo was an anti-poaching operation aimed at preventing the extinction of one of the most endangered species, namely the Patagonian toothfish, and other maritime resources such as Cape rock lobster and perlemoen (abalone). The operation led to the incarceration of poachers off the Cape south coast. 65 This illustrated that the creation of the RFD was a necessity as it proved its worth in assisting with the preservation of marine resources as part of the constabulary functions of the SAN.
Initially, the RFD consisted of a full-time company and a reserve company. Currently, it has three companies, which are rotated during operations. 66 The companies comprise the leadership element, a motor section and rifle platoons. The leadership element, made up of selected junior officers in the SAN, receives its training from Infantry School in Oudtshoorn. Some of these officers studied at the Military Academy such as Lieutenant (SAN) P.P. Hlungwani, Sub-lieutenant D.S. Thukani and Sublieutenant R.O. Letsoalo (current platoon commander in the MRS). The designated mustering of some of the senior officers and junior officers is combat officer (marine), which was approved recently following years of the precarious use of combat officer (dry) operating in an amphibious environment. In 2009, the MRS was equipped with a deployable base and support equipment for operational deployments in Africa (see Project Xena). 67 Between 2009 and 2010, several members of the SAN were deployed in peace missions in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia. 68 Some of these members were from the MRS as discussed later in the contribution on the Great Lakes region. Despite their contributions, RFD members face several challenges. The first challenge relates to the promotion of members. As a recently established unit headed by a captain (SAN), the promotion of combat officers (marine) is extremely slow. The second challenge, similar to those faced by other units of the SANDF, is ageing equipment. For instance, the boarding equipment used for fast roping is few years old and needs to be replaced. The third challenge is combat boots worn by the MRS. These boots are hard and suited for normal infantry soldiers that operate on land. 69 They are certainly not conducive for the amphibious environment in which marines operate. The boots should be replaced by a softer design suited for both the amphibious environment as well as land. These challenges impact on the morale of the marines and require urgent resolution to enable the members to perform their duties diligently. The equipment also requires maintenance; hence, the creation of the maintenance division.
Maintenance Division
According to Captain (SAN) S.A. Malepe, Officer Commanding MRS, the Maintenance Division is a very recent development created out of need. It should be emphasised that it is not a fighting division, but a support one. It is charged with keeping all equipment of the MRS in optimum operational condition. The MRS is equipped with tantalising equipment procured under Project Xena (see next section), which needs special care. To fulfil this need, the SAN instituted the Maintenance Division. 70 All equipment of the MRS including the boats of the OBD and ODD, as well as the vehicles and the FDB are maintained by the division.
Project Xena
Project Xena was first introduced to the public on 9 December 2008 when the MRS was commissioned. 71 The project comprised the inshore and riverine equipment acquisition programme for the MRS aimed at providing a fully integrated, balanced and deployable system. 72 Captain (SAN) N.
Marais, project officer, explained that a rapid capability requires not only boats, but also a system that can sustain the boats. 73 Consequently, it was necessary to acquire the boat system (including their trailers and a floating jetty), the FDB, command, control and communications, and transport. Project Xena was an R89-million project spanning from 2005 to 2009. 74 The equipment acquired through the project enabled the MRS to participate meaningfully in exercises and operations. 76 There are four sub-systems in the camp.
The first comprises accommodation, gym, a dining hall, refrigerators and ablution facilities. The second makes provision for laundry, sewage, water purification, generators and armoury. The third comprises the administration tent, command control and communication and intelligence, the workshop tent and caisson walls. The last sub-system is composed of a floating jetty, riverine patrol boats and landing craft. 77 It is worth noting that the camp is one of the best in the world. In fact, the USA and NATO forces use similar camps in Iraq and Afghanistan. 78 While there may be lack of questions for acquiring the FDB; however, one may question the suitability of the system procured. The fact that other developed nations such as the USA are utilising a similar camp might not be the sole centripetal factor to incline South Africa towards a similar system. Other considerations are also very much important. For instance, the USA has unquestionable air and sealift capability to transport the FDB to any place where its forces are deployed. In the case of South Africa, there is currently a lack of sealift capability to transport the FDB to theatres of operations. It is undeniable that road transport in the form of heavy-load trucks may be used to transport the FDB as witnessed when the base was displayed at SAS Saldanha Sports Field. It should be noted that the SAN does not have the capability to effectively sealift the FDB. Simply put, can the SAN operate the FDB in places such as the South African islands of Marion and Prince Edward or any other place accessible by sea?
The current answer to the question is negative, unless a private sealift capability is chartered or assistance is rendered by friendly international forces possessing the capability, such as the USA or France. Following the decommissioning of SAS Outeniqua, the SAS Drakensberg remains the only support vessel, apart from the limited role of the aged SAS Protea, supporting seagoing ships and transporting other South African forces and departments. It seems that the problem might be solved in the future through Project Millennium aimed at acquiring sealift capabilities for the SANDF in the form of Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock. 79 It should be noted; however, that Project Millennium seems to have lost momentum and currently its completion date remains unknown. Some are of the opinion that it might only be completed by the year 2025 or 2030. 80 Despite these challenges, the SAN has managed to deploy the MRS with its new equipment, excluding the FDB in most instances, to various multi-national and national exercises as well as operations, as discussed in the next section.
Multi-national and National Exercises
Multi-national exercises, particularly naval exercises, fall within the domain of naval presence, which is benevolent in nature. 81 These exercises are aimed at confidence building, encouraging naval interactions and cementing ties as well as creating and gaining influence within a theatre of operation. 82 Since its inception, the MRS has conducted various exercises in order to prepare for operations. Some of the exercises include Shared Accord, Golfinho, Good Hope, and Ndlovu.
Exercise Shared Accord
Shared Accord exercises are initiatives of the USA Africa Command (US AFRICOM) aimed at assisting African armed forces to deal with current African challenges. They mainly focus on rural upliftment on the African continent. 83 The following year, South Africa participated in Exercise Shared Accord 2011, which took place in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown from 18 July to 2 August 2011. Members of the MRS were part of the SAN contingent. Before the commencement of the exercise (between 30 May and 13 July 2011), members of the MRS conducted combat readiness training at the SAS Saldanha military area. The training included patrol, navigation, night navigation, section platoon attacks, a 10-km route march and pyrotechnic firing using live ammunition. The aim of Exercise Shared Accord 2011 was to provide comprehensive training between the armed forces of South Africa and the USA, as well as to build interoperability and mutual understanding between the two forces. 89 Rear-Admiral H. Teuteberg was the exercise commander. Elements from the South African Army (SA Army), SAAF, South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) and the SAN participated in the exercise. The USMC contingent exercised with the Grahamstown-based 6 South African Infantry Battalion (6 SAI) augmented by RFD members during the exercise. 90 The RFD played various roles including anti-piracy demonstrations, beach-landing, section attacks and counter attacks. The USMC contingent provided fire support during the exercise. 91 The SAAF and SAN conducted exercises at sea along the southern coast, and members of the MRS were also present conducting antipiracy exercises such as boarding operations and protection of vessels against pirates. At the closing ceremony, the exercise commander stated that the exercise had been a success. 92 The satisfaction of the exercise commander and the personal experiences of some of the interviewed officers participating in the exercise illustrated that the MRS was successful in its main roles both at sea and on land. During deployment at sea, the RFD protected naval vessels and conducted boarding operations to suspected ships as part of the exercise. These operations were executed successfully and provided the members with training in the execution of similar operations under Operation Copper (to be discussed later).
Exercise Golfinho
Exercise Golfinho was a multi-national exercise involving 11 Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and was held in September 2009. These members were Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 93 The aim of the exercise was to test multidimensional peace support operations readiness of SADC forces including the police and civilian elements in accordance with the African Union roadmap pertaining to the establishment of the SADC African Standby Force. 94 The actions demonstrated by the MRS in particular, and the SAN in general, reaffirmed the assertion that South Africa was ready for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The exercise also gave an opportunity for the MRS to test its capabilities before the June and July 2010 deployments (see Operation Kgwele).
The success of the 2010 exercise was followed by another one. This was Good Hope V held between 5 and 23 March 2012 in Durban, Simon's Town and the eastern and southern coast of South Africa. Similar to prior exercises, Good Hope V was aimed at building mutual understanding and interoperability between the two countries. In addition, it was intended to enhance anti-piracy capabilities of the SAN in order to deal with piracy off the East African coast under Operation Copper. 108 SAS Isandlwana, SAS Amatola, a Super Lynx helicopter, elements of the MRS and special forces represented South Africa. The special forces and members of the MRS have illustrated their capabilities and precision during the demonstration of a tactical movement aimed at deterring pirates and protecting a vessel. 109 These skills are direly needed as part of the deterrence capabilities of the SAN to eradicate piracy off the African coast. In addition to multi-national exercises, the SAN participate in national exercises. One of these exercises is briefly outlined below.
Exercise Ndlovu
Three years of scrupulous planning and dedication culminated in Exercise Ndlovu held in November 2011. Exercise Ndlovu was directed by Brigadier General Liebenberg headquartered in Kimberley. The exercise was aimed at assuring the country that the SANDF has defence and reaction capabilities to protect South Africa's sovereignty against any external attack from land, air or sea. 110 It was a combined exercise including the SA Army, the SAAF, the SAMHS and the SAN. Based on the scenario of the exercise, the landward forces encompassing elements of the SA Army, SAAF and SAMHS, covered the interior, while the seaward forces led by the SAN supported by the elements of the SAAF and SAMHS provided coastal protection.
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The landward forces demonstrated their capabilities in Bloemfontein, Potchefstroom, Lohatla and the Vastrap training area in Upington.
The seaward forces mobilised in Saldanha Bay. 112 The SAN deployed SAS Drakensberg (a combat support vessel), SAS Charlotte Maxeke (one of the three SAN submarines), SAS Umzimkulu (mine counter-measures vessel), and the MRS. SAS Charlotte Maxeke demonstrated naval coercion using submarine capability. 113 The SAN submarines are South Africa's ultimate strategic weapon. 114 The advantages of submarines enabling them to be instrumental as strategic weapons suited for gunboat diplomacy and naval warfare include stealth, mobility, firepower, endurance, survivability and effectiveness. 115 The SAN submarines have performed well when engaging with other forces during various exercises, particularly off the Cape south coast.
Members of the RFD boarded SAS Drakensberg from the fore flight deck as part of the fast-roping demonstration, while SAS Umzimkulu spotted "pirates" and responded with an anti-piracy attack on the "pirate" ship led by RFD members armed with R5 rifles. At the completion of the exercise, Brigadier General Liebenberg reported to the Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant General D. Mgwebi that it was a success and that junior officers have illustrated decisiveness, command and control. 116 These are the same attributes that make these officers valuable in various exercises and operations. It is clear that the MRS is an important component for the SAN and the SANDF. Although it may be considered an infant, the MRS has illustrated an unrivalled capability, at least in the African context, in demonstrating boarding operations and protecting vessels as well as performing other amphibious duties during the various exercises. It is this capability that makes the MRS a necessity in peace missions such as in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere.
Contributions in the Great Lakes Region
Prior to the formation of the MRS, the SAN contributed elements such as the Operational Boat Squadron and members of the Protection Force to the SANDF peacekeeping missions in the Great Lakes region as previously stated. Following its formation in 2006, the MRS deployed various elements to the Great Lakes region. 117 In 2007, during Operation Curriculum, initiated as a special task force in Burundi under the banner of the African Union, the MRS deployed members to that country. 118 Sublieutenant D.S. Thukani (then Able Seaman) deployed with 39 other members of the RFD in Burundi. The initial role of these members was to protect the very important people (VIPs) returning from exile to engage in the negotiating process. 119 This deployment included other members of the SANDF, which played various roles. 120 While RFD members were at the demobilisation centre at De Brug, Bloemfontein, preparing for deployment to Burundi, they faced a major setback when it became apparent that they were not trained for VIP protection. At the time of operational planning for the mission, it seems the responsible planners omitted to realise that the types of activities the MRS can perform, excluded VIP protection.
Certainly, the SAN has members that can perform VIP protection duties; 121 regrettably, the MRS members do not perform such operations. 122 While at De Brug, these members were almost withdrawn and returned to their base in Simon's Town. Fortunately, they were kept as part of the contingent. Their evitable failure to deploy to Burundi due to omission would not only have had serious ramifications for the MRS, but for the SAN as well. It is postulated that the MRS would have been viewed as a failure even though the planners were responsible for the omission. This is based on the understanding that the rationale for the resurrection of the third marines was their future role in conflict resolution and management, particularly peace missions.
The ability of decision-makers in the SANDF, Chief of Joint Operations and his staff in particular, to adapt to changing circumstances has saved the MRS embarrassment. Subsequently, other duties were allocated for the members. The main duty included protecting the houses in which the returning VIP members were housed instead of protecting the members themselves. Other roles encompassed guard duties. 123 The challenges experienced by the RFD members included the lack of adequate training, as the unit was still an infant, which caused anxiety. A contributing factor to this was the fact that many of the members were on their first deployment. The situation has changed drastically since that deployment of the RFD. Members have since underwent various training programmes both in the SAN, Infantry School and other training areas in South Africa and abroad, as well as multinational exercises with other navies and national exercises with other elements of the SANDF (as discussed) and the SAPS. The main duty of the members was to protect South African aviation elements, while the Indian contingent protected those of MONUSCO. 127 Other responsibilities included protecting civilians, humanitarian workers and human rights defenders under threat of physical violence from the belligerents at Goma, near Lake Kivu and surrounding areas. 128 During the deployment, no serious combat action was experienced, although uncertainty was rife. All 19 members deployed returned home safe and sound. The only challenges experienced by the members were disciplinerelated issues due to boredom. 129 Despite its contributions to the Great Lakes and other areas and missions, the major weakness of the MRS remains its equipment. Most of the equipment utilised was ageing and some had surpassed their life span, such as the boats mentioned earlier. In addition, other equipment was lacking. Failure to address the challenges with regard to equipment may result in the MRS unable to discharge its duties during operations.
Operation Kgwele
The Commander-in-Chief, President Jacob Zuma, has instructed the SANDF to assist the SAPS in securing the country during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The World Cup was one of the biggest sporting events in the sporting history of South Africa that attracted people from all walks of life. The country and the world were excited knowing that it was for the first time the event was hosted on the African continent. An event such as the 2010 World Cup does not only bring excitement and opportunities, but also threats or potential threats. In order to deter these threats, the SANDF initiated Operation Kgwele following the instruction of the President. 130 Brigadier General J. Liebenberg was the joint task force commander for the operation and he emphasised the importance of amalgamating the country's resources to ensure safety and security. 131 Dr Lindiwe Sisulu, then Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, visited the National Joint Operations Centre (NATJOC) at the SAAF Headquarters in Pretoria on 9 June 2010 to evaluate combat readiness with regard to Operation Kgwele. Brigadier General Liebenberg assured the Minister that the SANDF was geared and ready for the operation. 132 He also provided a concise presentation to the Deputy President, Kgalema Montlanthe, during his visit to the NATJOC on 9 July 2010. 133 During the operation, the SAN's main task was to ensure the safety of the three coastal host cities: Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. 134 Each of the harbours in the three cities was provided with one ship and its crew in order to react to the challenges should a need arise. In addition, 78 members were deployed in each harbour comprising:
-an ODT; -an HPB to conduct harbour and coastal patrols;
-survey motor boats to conduct underwater surveys;
-picture processing elements for underwater security and assessment; and -an underwater sabotage device disposal team for bomb disposal by ODT. 136 The SAN commenced deploying its members for the operation as early as 24 May 2010, 137 which was combined with Operation Corona aimed at deploying over 3 000 soldiers for border control by 2014. 138 The elements of the SAN participating in Operation Kgwele included frigates, submarines, a hydrographic survey ship, the MRS, two strike craft, two counter-measure vessels, and chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and explosives teams. SAS Amatola was deployed in Port Elizabeth, while SAS Spioenkop and SAS Mendi were deployed in Durban and Cape Town respectively. 139 SAS Protea, under the leadership of Captain (SAN) T.
Stokes, 140 was deployed in Port Elizabeth for the duration of the tournament to ensure the safety of the harbour and the stadium. 141 A hydrographic survey team equipped with sonar motor boats conducted sonar detection and sent the information to be processed on board the SAS Protea. 142 
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Umkomaas and SAS Umzimkulu conducted underwater security in Durban and Cape Town harbours. 143 Three platoons (one per stadium) of the MRS were deployed as observers around the stadia and were ready for rapid deployment anywhere needed. 144 The ODT was responsible for protecting the harbours from underwater threats, while the RFD platoons played multidimensional roles. They protected the harbours and also served as security around the venues at the stadia. In Cape Town, the MRS utilised the FDB. 145 The three venues in which the MRS was deployed did not experience any threats during the duration of the World Cup. Subsequently, it can be stated that the MRS contributed greatly to the success of Operation Kgwele by providing security and deterrence in the various areas of deployment during 2010. This success has illustrated that the MRS is an important asset in dealing with maritime challenges facing Southern Africa, particularly piracy in the Mozambique Channel and off the coast of Tanzania, provided a political will exists.
Dealing with Piracy: South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique Maritime Security Cooperation
Piracy has been a problem facing the world for many years. Recently, the coast along the Horn of Africa has been one of the areas affected by piracy. Yet, African states seemed to lack the political will to devise strategies to deal with piracy. But what is piracy? "Piracy" and "armed robbery" are defined by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) as "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act". 146 Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as illegal activities committed for private gains by the crew or passengers of a ship, against another ship, persons or property on board such a ship. 147 Over the past two decades, piracy became blatant and more vicious with the utilisation of handheld military hardware such as AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). 148 McNicholas highlights recent cases from the hijackings of the American transport barges Hawk and Falcon, to the attack of the United Arab freighter IBN Younos off the coast of Somalia en route from South Africa to Dubai. 149 Following these and other similar incidents, piracy became an issue of international concern. In fact, African waters are some of the world's dangerous waters in terms of piracy. 150 Off the African coast, Potgieter states that piracy is a serious concern, which needs immediate attention. 151 Evidently, during various meetings and conferences such as the third Sea Power for Africa Symposium held in 2009, piracy topped the agenda and the SAN and its African counterparts have appreciated that piracy need to be eradicated. 152 These sentiments are shared by analysts such as Heitman, who states that the expanding role of South Africa as a regional power in the quest for international peace and security would likely extend the role of the SAN to anti-piracy operations to enhance maritime security in Southern Africa. 153 However, it seems that the political will on the part of African decision-makers was lacking with regard to conducting anti-piracy operations. Kruger argues that there was increasing pressure on South Africa to join anti-piracy operations off the east African coast. In addition, the European Union requested the country to join the task force on antipiracy. 154 The reasons for the reluctance then remained open-ended. It can be postulated that it is perhaps due to a lack of resources as many African states have relatively small, regrettably insignificant navies, which rely on South Africa for assistance in the maritime domain. 155 These are sentiments amongst flag officers and other high-ranking officers from various navies around the world as reflected during the third Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) held at the Cape Town International Convention Centre from 10 to 13 April 2012. 156 The delegates at IONS 2012 believe that the SAN is powerful and can play a leading role in combating piracy, 157 because it has modern, fully equipped frigates and the MRS, which can be adapted to anti-piracy operations. 158 However, to deal with piracy and other maritime challenges effectively, a political will is a prerequisite. 159 For a number of years following the upsurge of piracy off the Horn of Africa, South Africa made no commitments to anti-piracy operations. The SAN declared its readiness to embark on anti-piracy operations; however, only the president and Parliament could make the final decision. By implication, no political will prior to 2011 emanated from government pertaining to ways to deal with piracy. Nonetheless, the SAN admitted its readiness to deploy whenever needed and has always sent its members on special courses and missions to acquire more knowledge on piracy. In 2010, for instance, the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) in Somalia offered the SAN an opportunity to deploy officers as observers to some of their operations. 162 The three officers also observed the planning and execution of anti-piracy operations.
In January 2011, two cases of piracy off the Southern African coastline were confirmed. The first was a Taiwanese fishing trawler that went missing on 25 December 2010 northeast of Madagascar, and the second was a Mozambican fishing trawler that was reported missing between Mozambique and Madagascar. The latter was spotted towed by pirates towards the Comoros. In addition, there were confirmed cases of attempted piracy on ships in the vicinity of Beira port in Mozambique in December 2010. One of the reasons for piracy in Southern African waters is the geography of the coastline. The Mozambique Channel is attractive to pirates because it forms a natural corridor separating Mozambique and Madagascar and reduces the manoeuvrability of vessels, making them vulnerable to attacks. The maritime traffic in the area is also dominated by unarmed vessels and is an alternative route for cargo and other commercial vessels avoiding the route near the Horn of Africa. 163 The absence, at that time, of anti-piracy patrol forces also made the region more attractive to pirates because countries in the region, with the exception of South Africa, lack naval assets to patrol the waters. Since 2008, the Horn of Africa, on the other hand, is patrolled by naval deterrence forces from states such as Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. In December 2008, the European Union commissioned Operation Atalanta, a naval operation to deter piracy and related activities off the coast of Somalia. 164 Other operations include those conducted by the USA's Combined Task Force 151, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield and other navies. 165 Since 2011, the situation with regard to political will has significantly changed in Southern Africa. During a SADC defence meeting aimed at developing an anti-piracy strategy in July 2011, Minister Sisulu admitted that piracy was becoming a major concern for Southern Africa. She added that military strategists were devising options to deal with piracy.
Witnessing the propensity that piracy seemed to be moving towards Southern Africa, Parliament, after requests from Mozambique and Tanzania, approved naval patrols along the Mozambique Channel and off the coast of Tanzania to deter piracy commencing in early 2011. These patrols are carried out under Operation Copper (discussed later). To intensify antipiracy efforts, ministers of defence of South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania have signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) on maritime security cooperation in February 2012. The aim of the MoU is to eliminate piracy and to ensure security and the safety of the East African coast from Tanzania and Mozambique to South Africa. At the signing of the MoU, President Jokaya Kikwete of Tanzania expressed his appreciation to President Zuma of South Africa and President Armando Guebuza of Mozambique for joining hands in fighting piracy in Southern African waters. 167 The MoU illustrates the seriousness of piracy and the political will to fight the phenomenon. Whether anti-piracy operations can be sustained for a longer period and ultimately lead to the safety and security in Southern African waters remain to be seen. Currently, however, anti-piracy operations are continuing under Operation Copper.
Operation Copper: Anti-Piracy Operations off the Southern African Coast
Operation Copper is an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Mozambique and Tanzania that began in early 2011 following the call for South Africa to begin playing a meaningful role in eradicating piracy at sea. 168 The operation may be comprehended within the ambit of South African naval diplomacy, which is defined as the use of maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and management to support foreign policy objectives. 169 Maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and management are four functions of South African naval diplomacy informed by SANGP 100 clarifying the traditional roles of the SAN, namely the diplomatic, military and policing roles, as well as various theories of naval diplomacy by authors such as Geoffrey Till, James Cable, Kenneth Booth, Edward Luttwak and Alfred Mahan. 170 Maritime coercion is a province of Cable's gunboat diplomacy, which is defined as the use of limited naval force including definitive force, purposeful force, catalytic force and expressive force in support of foreign policy objectives. 171 Maritime coercion consists of two subsets: maritime deterrence and compellence. The former refers to an action pursued to influence the other party to refrain from certain actions by creating a belief that the ends of such actions will outweigh the means, whereas the latter is an action taken to create awareness that the outcome of an action or lack of action by an actor may have grievous consequences. 172 The former is conducted when the vessels in question give their consent for the MRS to board, and the latter involves vessels refusing to comply with boarding requests. During compliant boarding, the crew of the vessels are informed of the requirements. For instance, fishing vessels are required to have all their permits in a central place such as the bridge. Cargo vessels that have private security personnel to protect themselves against pirates are advised to store away all weapons on board. 184 Non-compliant boarding operations entail vessels, particularly fishing vessels, which refuse granting access to the MRS to conduct search operations on board. These types of operations are divided into two subgroups, namely opposed and unopposed boarding operations. 185 Opposed non-compliant boarding operations include a threat of use of force as members board the ships with weapons ready to return fire if attacked. These are dangerous operations, which may often be performed under fire from the opposing forces. Unopposed non-compliant boarding operations do not necessary include the threat of force. They may be a consequence of lack or failure of communication between the MRS and the crew of the vessels due to technical failures. When members board the vessels during these operations, they are unopposed by the crews on board. The MRS has conducted unopposed non-compliant operations during Operation Copper. The crew of vessels, fishing vessels in particular, often cite the issue of time as the reason for their refusal. Time is of the essence for fishing trawlers, and inspection of a vessel implies that the crew has to stop its duties for the duration of the boarding operation. Nonetheless, boarding operations are conducted as long as the vessel is deemed suspicious.
Suspicious vessels include those not responding to radio contact and those identified by intelligence services as having connections to piracy and other illicit activities. Since the beginning of Operation Copper, there have been more than two rotations of members of the MRS responsible for boarding. 186 It was during a boarding operation that the MRS lost one of its 193 Currently, the MRS is using the old doctrine inconsistent with the current challenges such as piracy. Subsequently, the members have to explain to the officers commanding various ships and elements of the SAAF with regard to boarding procedures. It should be expressed that the sooner the new CoO is approved the sooner this challenge can be resolved. Based on the fact that most of the Southern African trade is conducted via the sea, it seems that Operation Copper will likely continue for many years to come and the MRS officers should be empowered with all the resources, including doctrines and CoO reflecting the current challenges.
Conducting anti-piracy operations shows South Africa's commitment towards maritime security in African waters. Some analysts, however, such as Heitman, believe that deployment to the Mozambique Channel should have commenced ages ago because piracy is threatening South Africa's commercial interests. 194 It should be considered that combating piracy off
The East African coast is not the sole responsibility of South Africa.
Although most states in the region lack naval assets, they are also responsible for resolving the situation and deterring piracy. There are two pertinent questions regarding anti-piracy operations in the South African case. Firstly, is South Africa capable of conducting such anti-piracy operations at a greater scale or not? Secondly, has Operation Copper, from its commencement in 2011 to 2012, been successful or not?
The answer to the first question may be attributed to resources. The defence budget cuts are limiting the SAN's operational capabilities. Government reduced the sea-going hours to 8 000 for 2011 and 2012, from 9 000 in 2010. Given this reality, the SAN can only afford to deploy one frigate and, perhaps a support vessel, on each rotation for Operation Copper. The four frigates and SAS Drakensberg rotate deployment to the Mozambique Channel. Engaging in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia seems to be unproductive for the SAN given the fact that approximately 30 other foreign naval vessels are engaged in anti-piracy operations in the area. Thus, it is justifiable for the SAN to concentrate its operations in SADC waters to avoid overstretching its capabilities. 195 Failure to concentrate on SADC waters may not only result in an inability to perform the primary and secondary functions of the SAN as provided in the Constitution, but also Operation Copper. In attempting to answer the second question, the success of Operation Copper and the contribution of the MRS should not be judged by the number of pirates apprehended. In fact, the MRS has not yet apprehended any pirates except contributing to those apprehended in April 2012 as cited. The successes, however, should be judged by the fact that suspicious activities in the Mozambique Channel and off the coast of Tanzania have decreased in the past two years.
Various sources have reported a plunge in piracy off the East African coast in the recent past. The 2011 Annual Report of the IMB states that the number of successful hijackings by Somali pirates has decreased from 49 in 2010 to 28 in 2011. 196 As reported by The New York Times, statistics released by the US Navy revealed that only nine pirate attacks have been successful this year compared to 34 in 2011 and 68 in 2010. 197 Regardless of the inconsistencies in 2010 and 2011 numbers, the trend is that piracy around Somalia has declined. This decline can be credited to aggressive anti-piracy patrols by international navies operating in the area as well as measures taken by commercial shipping companies such as employing private security personnel on board ships. 198 The fact that no vessel has been hijacked since Operation Copper commenced in the Mozambique Channel and the Tanzania coast illustrates the success of the operation. Although there are reports of piracy descending from the Horn of Africa towards Southern Africa, as indicated by Minister Sisulu and Vice-Admiral Mudimu during IONS 2012, 199 the region has not yet experienced major challenges. Subsequently, it may be argued that the SAN in general, and the MRS and the elements of special forces in particular, together with other elements involved in the operation have successfully conducted maritime deterrence in the region. Without naval anti-piracy patrols, the region would be experiencing piracy as illustrated by the cited piracy cases.
Conclusion
In order to possess a marine capability, South Africa established three sets of marines during different periods since the formation of the UDF in 1912. South Africa, however, lacks an unbroken history of an organisation that developed over time. The three different marines were created for various reasons specific to the time of their creation. The aim of this article was to analyse the MRS as the resurrected marine capability of the SAN. The reasons for the creation of the MRS were articulated in the article. In addition, the roles and functions of the MRS have been dealt with. Undoubtedly, the MRS symbolises the resurrected marine capability created to enable the SAN to contribute meaningfully to South Africa's involvement in peace missions. Although Project Xena has equipped the MRS with the boat system as well as the FDB, the unit still faces several challenges including the lack of strategic sealift capability and proper equipment for boarding operations. In addition, the current equipment is either aged or is ageing.
Its revised and updated CoO is yet to be approved. Regardless of these challenges, the MRS has participated in naval and other exercises such as Shared Accord, Golfinho, Good Hope, and Ndlovu in which it played multidimensional roles from beach-landing to anti-piracy demonstrations. In order to contribute to international conflict resolution and management as part of South African naval diplomacy, the MRS deployed elements to the Great Lakes region to perform boat operations in Lake Kivu and Tanganyika, guarding duties in Burundi and aviation protection duties in the DRC. Internally, the MRS has provided maritime and naval deterrence in the coastal host cities of Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town during Operation Kgwele in 2010.
As part of maritime and naval cooperation with other navies in the region, South Africa entered into a MoU with Tanzania and Mozambique aimed at eradicating piracy and other sources of maritime insecurity in Southern Africa. The MoU strengthens Operation Copper in which the MRS has been continuously involved since 2011. This operation is part of the maritime and naval coercion domain of South African naval diplomacy. The RFD conducts compliant and non-compliant boarding operations, which include opposed and unopposed boarding during the deployment on board suspicious vessels. Although the MRS has not yet apprehended pirates, it assisted other forces during the recent arrests of pirates by Tanzanian authorities. The operation seems to have served as deterrence for pirates in the region as demonstrated by the plunge in reported attempted and actual pirate hijackings. Based on the findings, the MRS is indeed the resurrected marine capability for the SAN.
To ensure that the MRS continues to be the marine capability, it is recommended that the SAN should resolve the challenges faced by the unit. The equipment (for example suitable boats) of the members should be conducive to the amphibious environment; fast-roping equipment for boarding operations should always be serviceable and reliable because the members' lives depend on it; the ageing diving boats for the ODD should be replaced; and sealift capability is a necessity for the unit to deploy with the FDB to distant regions. Failure to address most of these challenges will result in the resurrected marine capability being reduced to nothing but a force for ceremonial purposes. The success of the MRS depends largely on the support of the SAN, the SANDF and government.
Unlike the previous two marines that lasted 5 and 10 years respectively, it seems the MRS would likely survive for a very long period because there are no indications that the recent missions such as anti-piracy and peace missions will end in the near future. Hence, support from all stakeholders is of importance for the MRS to survive. The creation of three types of marines during different periods indicates that South Africa and the SAN have always wanted a marine capability, but the will to provide the necessities institutionally, such as adequate funding, to ensure the success of the force, seemed to be lacking. For the MRS to survive and be successful, it is necessary to take serious cognisance of what is required to make it work. 
